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BANNING WASTE EXPORTS:
MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING
Mark A. Montgomery*

INTRODUCTION

In March of this year, representatives of the sixty-four states that have
ratified the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements
of Hazardous Waste and Their Disposal1 met for the second time in Geneva.2
At this meeting of the Conference of the Parties, these sixty-four states
unanimously decided to ban the export of hazardous waste from members of
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to
non-OECD countries? This ban took immediate effect for all waste
shipments bound for disposal. It was also agreed that shipments bound for
recycling or recovery will be phased out by the end of 1997.
Environmental organizations cheered the export ban as a "historic5
victory,"' as well as a giant step toward solving the waste trade "crisis."
These organizations felt that the export ban would mean that the poor nations

* The author received his PhD in international relations from the Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy at Tufts University. He is now an Assistant Professor of International Environmental
Policy at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.
1. U.N. Doc. UNEP/IG 80/3, 1989, reprinted in, I.L.M. 657 (1989). (The current text with
revisions made by the First and Second Conferences of the Parties is available from the Basel
Convention Secretariat, Geneva. The Convention entered into force in May 1992, when Australia
became the 20th state to ratify it. See UNEP Director TolbaAnnounces Basel Convention Effective
May 5, BNA, Apr. 17, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Int'l Env'tl Daily File. (Since
March 1994, six more countries have ratified the Convention, bringing the total to seventy.)
2. Basel Treaty PartnersAgree to Ban Waste Exports to Nations Outside OECD, 17 INT'L ENV'TL
REP. (BNA) 297-298 (Apr. 6, 1994).
3. Decision11/12 of the Partiesto the Base! Convention on the Control of TransboundaryMovements
of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposaladopted in Geneva Mar. 21-25, 1994, reprinted in 17 INT'L
ENV'TL. REP. (BNA) 338 (Apr. 6, 1994). All of the decisions made by the Parties, including
Decision 11/12, are contained in The Report of the Second Meeting ofthe Conference of the Parties to
the Basel Convention, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CHW.2/30 (1994).
4. Basel Treaty PartnersAgree to Ban Waste Exports to Nations Outside OECD, supra note 2.
5. See Mary Critharis, Third World Nations areDown in the Dumps: The Exportation ofHazardous
Waste, 16 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 311, 313 (1990); (characterizes the international waste trade as a

"crisis").
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of the world no longer would be victims of "toxic colonialism." 6 Such praise,
however, is overly effusive. This article examines the newly-adopted ban on
hazardous waste exports, and it concludes that the ban is largely
inconsequential in both its legal and practical effect. This paper also argues
that attempts to tighten the ban on waste exports are unwarranted.
THE

BASEL CONVENTION

The Basel Convention was signed in March 1989, after several years
of negotiations sponsored by the United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP).7 A thorough analysis of the Convention lies outside the scope of
this paper. However, many scholars, including this author,8 have evaluated
it elsewhere. 9
The Basel Convention provides for a system of "prior informed
consent" or PIG." ° This means that any state seeking to export waste must
first notify the would-be importing state of the intended transfer. This written
notification must contain detailed information about the nature of the waste,
its constituent elements, and its hazardous characteristics. The importing state
then has the opportunity to accept or reject the shipment." The Convention

6. Cathleen Fogel, Perils of the Era of Toxic Colonialism, Sac. Bee, Aug. 22, 1993, at F03 (Ms.
Fogel is Political Advisor to the Toxic Trade Campaign for Greenpeace International).
7. See Suzanne Rublack, Controlling TransboundaryMovements ofHazardousWast" The Evolution
of a Global Convention, 13 FLETcHER F. WORLD AFF. 113 (1989).
8. Mark A. Montgomery, Traveling Toxic Trash: An Analysis of the 1989 Basel Convention, 14
FLETcHER F. WORLD AFF. 314 (1990).
9. See Katharina Kummer, The International Regulation of Transboundary Traffic in Hazardous
Wastes: The 1989 Basel Convention, 41 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 530 (1992); David J. Abrams, Note
Regulating the International Hazardous Waste Trad" A Proposed Global Solution, 28 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 801 (1990); Marguerite M. Cusak, Comment, International Law and the
Transboundary Shipment of Hazardous Waste to the Third World: Will the Basel Convention Make
a Difference?., 5 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 393 (1990); David P. Hackett, An Assessment of the
Basel Convention on the Control of Hazardous Waste and Their Disposal, 5 AM. U. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 291 (1990).
10. See Lothar Gundling, PRIOR INFORMED NOTIFIcATION AND CONSULTATION IN
TRANsFERRING HAZARDOUS TECHNOLOGIES AND SUBsTANcEs: THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
CHALLENGE 63-82 (Gunther Handl and Robert E. Lutz eds., 1989).
11. See supra note 1, Article 6 of the Basel Convention outlines the procedures for notification
and consent.
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states that the transfer cannot occur until the competent authority 2 in the
importing state gives its express, written approval. If for some reason a state
receives imports of hazardous waste without having given its consent, the
exporting state has a duty to re-import the waste."
Critics of the Convention have focused upon its weaknesses:
potential loopholes, 4 vague definitions,"5 and inadequate enforcement
mechanisms.16 These criticisms, although justifiable, are neither surprising
nor unique. It is the nature of law to have loopholes of one sort or another.
The trademark of diplomacy is vague language, and all international law has
"inadequate" enforcement mechanisms. Because international law lacks a
supranational enforcement authority, it is both imperfect and self-enforcing.
Other critics have condemned the Convention on moral grounds.
Greenpeace has been the most strident, and the most effective, of these moral
critics. Greenpeace believes that any attempt to legitimize the waste trade,
especially from rich to poor countries, is morally unconscionable. Greenpeace
has asserted that the Basel Convention has done little if anything to stem the
tide of illegal waste shipments
to developing countries, and that all waste
17
exports should be prohibited.
Textual weaknesses and moral arguments aside, the true test of the
Convention is in its implementation: how well has it enabled states to control
transboundary movements of hazardous waste in such a way that all states,
rich and poor alike, can protect human health and the environment? Alas,
answering this question is not so easy.
One difficulty in analyzing this question is that the Basel Convention
has been in force for only two years. This may be an inadequate length of

12. See supra note 1, "Competent authority" is defined in Article 2.6 of the Basel Convention as
the "one governmental authority designated by a Party to be responsible, within such geographical
areas as the Party may think fit, for receiving the notification of a transboundary movement of
hazardous wastes or other wastes, and any information related to it, and for responding to such
notification .. ".
13. See supra note 1, Artide 8 of the Basel Convention outlines the duty to re-import.
14. See, eg., Hackett, supra note 9, at 313-23.
15. See, eg., Brian Wynne, The Toxic Waste Trad" InternationalRegulatory Issues and Options, 11
THIRD WORLD Q. 120, 139-41 (1984).
16. See, eg., Critharis, supra 5, at 333-34.
17. GREENPEACE, INTERNATIONAL WASTE TRADE PROJECT, THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN
WAsTEs: A GREENPEACE INVENTORYAT 5-9 aim Vallette and Heather Spaulding, eds., 5th ed.,
1990) [hereinafter GREENPEACE INVENTORY]. See also Bill Lambrecht, Waste Tightening: Third
World Acts Against Toxic Garbage,ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 3, 1994, at 1E (quoting Jim
Vallette of Greenpeace as saying there was a "moral mandate" to ban waste exports.)
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time in which to judge the effectiveness of any international legal instrument.
The second, and more troublesome, problem is that there have been few
comprehensive empirical studies of transboundary waste movements. Most of
the information we have about the international waste trade, legal or illegal,
is inconsistent, anecdotal, and unreliable.
DOUBTS ABOUT THE MAGNITUDE OF THE WASTE TRADE

It is widely acknowledged that the overwhelming majority of
transboundary shipments of hazardous waste occur legally between
industrialized countries with well developed regulatory regimes that ensure the
environmentally sound management of the waste.18 The amount of toxic
waste legally transferred to non-OECD countries has been quite small,
especially in relation to the total quantity of hazardous waste generated in the
world. 19 Only a small portion-less than one-half of 1%-of the hazardous
waste generated in industrialized countries ever crosses a national frontier, and
at least 80-90% of all exported waste moves from one OECD country to
another. °
Governments and international organizations have compiled some
statistics on the movement of waste shipments from rich to poor countries,

18. See, for example, Sean D. Murphy, Prospective Liability Regimes for the Transboundary
Movement of Hazardous Wastes, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 30-31 (1994).
19. A report co-edited by Mostafa Tolba, former Executive Director of UNEP, and published
under its auspices, says that Europe legally exports 120,000 tons of hazardous waste to developing
MOSTAFA K. TOLBA and OsAMA A. EL-KHoLY, THE WORLD
countries each year.
ENVIRONMENT 1972-1992: TWO DECADES OF CHALLENGE 268 (1992). European countries
generate approximately 30 million tons of hazardous waste per year. This means that Europe
legally exports 0.4% of its hazardous waste to developing countries. But these figures are
unreliable. Tolba and El-Kholy cite the source of their statistics as ANDY CRuMP, DICTIONARY
OF ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT: PEOPLE, PLACES, IDEAS AND ORGANIZATIONS 122
(1993). Crump, for his part, gives no reference to support his statistic regarding legal hazardous
waste exports from Europe. Drawing upon data compiled by the OECD, Hilz notes that OECD
countries generated about 287,586,000 tons of hazardous waste per year in the 1980s, and exported
1,197,000 per year. This would mean that OECD countries exported 0.4% the waste they
generated, with most of that going to other OECD countries. Hilz speculates, but is unable to
document, that over half of all exported waste has been to non-OECD countries. CHRISTOPH
Hnz, THE INTERNATIONALTOXIC WASTE TRADE 18-24 (1992). Greenpeace Canada has reported
that of the eight million tons of hazardous waste produced in 1992, Canada exported 209,000 tons
to developing countries (which amounts to 2.6% of the total production), Environment Minister
Says Canada Support System to Monitor Hazardous Waste Exports, 17 INT'L ENV'TL. REP. (BNA)
252 (Mar. 23, 1994).
20. See, also, UNITED NATIONS, UNITED NATIONS
ENVIRONMENTAL DATA REPORT 345 (3rd. ed. 1991).

ENVIRONMENT

PROGRAMME,
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but these statistics reflect primarily legal transfers. 2' A handful of non-OECD
countries have knowingly and willingly given their express, written consent
to receive shipments of hazardous waste from an OECD member country.
Mexico, for example, has received hazardous waste imports from the United
States. Most of this imported waste was sent to a single zinc reprocessing
plant that was licensed and inspected by the Mexican environmental protection
agency.12 Brazil has also received, and has approved of, hazardous waste
imports from the United States on numerous occasions.32 Despite the dearth
of good comparative statistics, it is relatively easy to track legal waste exports,
as most European and North American governments keep records of these
transfers. 4 Still, these data are imperfect, and more work needs to be done
collecting and comparing this official information.
25
Quantifying the illegal trade is a much more difficult task.
Greenpeace is the most widely-cited source of information about international
waste transfers to developing countries. 26 Because UNEP does not yet collect

21. United Nations, Report of the Secretary General, Development and International Economic
Cooperation: Environment (Illegal Traffic in Toxic and DangerousProducts and Wastes, U.N.
Doc. A/44/362 (1989). Given its date of publication, this report does not take into account waste
transfers since the Basel Convention was ratified. UNEP has compiled other statistics, but these
do not reflect legal waste transfers since the Convention has been in force. UNrTED NATIONS,
UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 20.
22. For more on hazardous waste imports into Mexico, see Barbara Seramstad, Comment,
Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastesfrom the United States to Mexico, 4 TRANSNAT'L
LAW. 253 (1991). See also, Adam L. Moskowitz, CriminalEnvironmental Law: Stopping the Flow
of Hazardous Waste to Mexico, 22 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 159 (1991-1992).
23. United States Environmental ProtectionAgency WasteExport Notification Log Notice Numbers
3017-26, 3017-29, 3017-C48, 3017-C-49, 3017 C-51, 3017 C-52, 3017-7/88, 3017-25/88, 3017-5/89,
3017-21/89, 3016-66/89, 9301706689. See also, GREENPEACE INVENTORY, supra note 17, at 131134.
24. These are compiled in UNITED NATIONS, UNrrED NATIONS ENVIRONMENTPROGRAMME,
supra note 20, at 335-336.
25. Decision 11/4 of the Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention has adopted an action
plan to begin to address the lack of reliable information regarding the illegal traffic of hazardous
waste. The plan provides for the establishment of a well-defined reporting system by which
Parties would inform the Secretariat of the Basel Convention of instances of illegal traffic. The
Decision also proposes cooperation with the Customs Cooperation Council Secretariat, the
International Maritime Organization, and Interpol.
26. Recent references to the statistics compiled by Greenpeace as important and reliable sources
of information about transboundary movements of hazardous waste to developing countries
include: Laura A. Strohm, The Environmental Politics ofthelnternational Waste Trade, 2 J. ENV'TL
& DEV. 131-32 (1993); D. Kofi Asante-Duah, F. Frank Saccomanno &John H. Shortreed, The
Hazardous Waste Trade" Can It Be Controlled? 269 ENV'TL Sci. & TECH. 1687 (1992); Julienne
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waste trade data of its own,27 it has in the past relied upon Greenpeace's
information in publishing its own reports on the waste trade.28 Greenpeace
has documented a number of proposals to ship toxic waste to developing
countries. 29 However, these proposals never went further than the front
pages of the international press: the proposals apparently died in the glare of
the media spotlight. These proposals were either flatly rejected by the wouldbe importing state, or were abandoned by the brokers. An illustrative example
is the case of Somalia. Waste brokers apparently proposed to ship hundreds
of thousands of tons of hazardous waste to Somalia in 1991, at the height of
its civil war.3 0 The proposal was abandoned.31 There have only been a
handful of incidents in which a developing country received shipments of
hazardous waste without the importing government's knowledge or
permission, and in the majority of these cases, the waste was returned to the
originating country.32
I. Adler, United States' Waste Export Control Program: Burying Our Neighbors in Garbage,40 AM.
U. L. REV. 885 (1991); Christoph Hilz and John R. Ehrenfeld, Transbounday Movements of
Hazardous Wastes-A Comparative Analysis of Policy Options to Control the International Waste
Trade, 3 INT'L ENVTL AFF. 27-28 (1991); CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING AND BILL
MOYERS, Global Dumping Ground: The International Traffic in Hazardous Waste 5 (1990); Briane
Wynne, supra note 15 at 120 (1989); Barbara D. Huntoon, Emerging Controls on Transfers of
Hazardous Waste to Developing Countries, 21 J. WoRLD TRADE L. 248 (1989); Peter Obstler,
Toward a Working Solution to Global Pollution: Importing CERCLA to Regulate the Export of
Hazardous Waste, 16 YALE J. INT'L. L. 73 (1991); Barry G. Rabe, Exporting Hazardous Waste in
North America, 3 INT'L. ENV'TL. AFF. 109-10 (1991); Marguerite M. Cusack, supra note 9.
27. The Secretariat of the Basel Convention has recently begun the process of compiling statistics
on the legal and illegal trade in hazardous waste, but this information is not yet publicly available.
Telephone Interview with Mr. Pierre Portas, Secretariat of the Basel Convention (Aug. 17, 1994).
28. United Nations, United Nations Environment Programme, supra note 20, at 335-36.
29. The number of these proposals is unclear. One press report cites 693 proposals uncovered
by Greenpeace between 1989 and March 1994: Bill Lambrecht, supra note 17. Even if this figure
is accurate, it contains proposals that were made prior to May 1992 when the Basel Convention
entered into force, and it does not indicate how many of those proposals actually resulted in a
waste transfer. Greenpeace has not compiled a complete inventory of waste trade proposals since
1990. Vallette and Spalding, eds., GREENPEACE INVENTORY, supra note 17.
30. Aidan Hartley, Contract Shows Plan to Dump Toxic Waste in Somalia," Reuter Library Rep.,
Sept. 7, 1992, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter file.
31. Agence France Presse, Toxic Waste Shipment to Somalia Believed Aborted: UNEP, Agence
France Press, Oct. 6, 1992 available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, APF File.
32. See GREENPEACE INVENTORY supra note 17. For an attempt to objectively analyze the
Greenpeace data, see Mark A. Montgomery, The Waste Trade "Crisis" What Do We Really Know?
(unpublished manuscript, on file with The Buffalo Journal of InternationalLaw).
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What seems to have become a common type of illegal waste trade is
the importation of what a buyer perceives to be a good-quality, usable product,
but upon delivery, the buyer discovers that he has received useless,
contaminated, or even dangerous materials. This is fraud. It can occur in any
kind of trade, and its victims have no socio-economic boundaries-they can be
rich importers and poor importers alike.33 One often cited incident occurred
in Bangladesh, in 1991; importers bought fertilizer that they later discovered
had been mixed with dust from a copper smelter.14 It is interesting to note
that this transfer would have been considered illegal under the terms of the
Basel Convention, had it been in force." Furthermore, the United States
government prosecuted and convicted the South Carolina company that
exported the waste36 and agreed to take back the remaining toxic fertilizer
even though the United States was under no formal, legal obligation to do
so.17 Similar incidents have taken place in Haiti," Zimbabwe, 39 Sierra

33. For example, in 1988, a French firm knowingly (and legally) imported hazardous waste from
West Germany. When the firm tested the waste, it found that the waste contained more heavy
metals than were found when it was tested in West Germany. The firm rejected the waste.
GREENPEACE INVENTORY, supra note 17, at 318. In another case, a firm in the Netherlands
received contaminated oil from West Germany. GREENPEACE INVENTORY, supra note 17, at 342.
Also, in 1990, a British company found that waste imported from Ireland did not conform to
mutually agreeable specifications. This involved a dispute with the Irish firm over who should
pay for disposal of the waste. GREENPEACE INVENTORY, supra note 17, at 366.
34. Masud Hasan Khan, Bangladesh-Environment Shipping Back Toxic Fertilizer,INTER PRESS
SERVIcE, July 18, 1994 availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, Inter Press Service File.
35. Neither Bangladesh nor the United States have ratified the Convention to date. See also supra
note 1.
36. John H. Cushman, Jr., Clinton Seeks Ban on Export of Most Hazardous Waste, NEW YORK
TMES, Mar. 1, 1994, at A18. The judgment on this case was handed down in federal district court
in South Carolina, on November 1, 1993. Two companies, Gaston Copper Recycling Company
and its parent, Southwire Corporation, were handed a $1 million fine as part of a plea bargain,
U.S. v. Stoller Chemical Co., U.S.D.C. for South Carolina, no. CR2:92:289.
37. Government FirmsSubmit Plan to Return Tainted Fertilizerfrom Bangladesh to US, BNA, July
6,1994 available in CAL ENV'TL. DAILY (BNA) LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNA file; Masud Hasan
Khan, supra note 34.
38. See GREENPEACE INVENTORY, supra note 17, at 21-23. This incident involved the notorious
"pariah ship," Khian Sea. This ship was loaded with incinerator ash, and it wandered the world
seeking a port where it could unload its cargo. At one point during its two-year odyssey, the
ship's owners approached the Haitian government for permission to unload. Haitian officials
issued a permit to allow the Khian Sea to unload what they were told was fertilizer. As the ship's
crew began unloading the ash, the Haitian government learned of the ship's true cargo, and sent
the police and the army to forcibly reload the ash and expel the Khian Sea from Haitian waters.
To avoid such a confrontation, the Khian Sea set sail in the middle of the night, leaving a portion
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Leone, 0 and Poland. 4'
However, once again, without a systematic,
empirical study of the quantity and direction of illegal waste movements, it is
difficult to say with any certainty that non-OECD countries are subject to
greater environmental damage from this sort of trade than OECD countries.
Greenpeace and others stress the possibility that these cases of fraud
represent the "tip of the iceberg" of illegal waste transfers to developing
countries.42 This may be true, but it remains only a possibility because of the
anecdotal nature of these reports; it is not an established fact. A number
of anecdotes seem to support the idea that developing countries have become

of its cargo behind. The ash remains in Haiti. Though Greenpeace asserts that the ash from the
Khian Sea contained high levels of dioxin that posed extreme risks to health and the environment,
the Pan American Health Organization, which sent technicians to Haiti to test the toxicity of the
waste and to investigate alleged health problems, found traces of toxins so small that the
technicians concluded that the waste posed no serious threat to human health or the environment.
See United States Department of State Telegram Limited Official Use Port-au-Prince 02003, March
23, 1988.
39. GREENPEACE INVENTORY, supra note 17, at 112-14. In this case a Zimbabwean business
imported what it believed were usable resins and cleaning fluids. Instead, they received useless
waste materials from two brokers in the United States, who have since been imprisoned for
violating American waste disposal regulations.
40. GREENPEACE INVENTORY, supra note 17, at 102. In this case, citizens of Sierra Leone
imported what they thought was road construction material from Europe. It was found to be of
poor quality and tainted with ammonia, formaldehyde, and carbon monoxide. Several hundred
bags of this mixture was then dumped in a municipal garbage dump. The government of Sierra
Leone arrested the importers for illegal dumping.
41. Steve Coll, Free Market Intensifies Waste Problem: Rich Nations Dumping on Poorer Ones,
WASH. POST, March 23, 1994 at Al. Poland has received shipments of what were characterized
as donations of medical supplies, but upon inspection were found to be used syringes, tights,
underwear, and other unusable medical waste.
42. GREENPEACE INVENTORY, supra note 17, Preface. This assumption is echoed by Christoph
Hilz, supra note 19, at 18-24; Wynne, supra note 15, at 120; Rabe, supra note 26, at 110.; Danny
Worrell, Issues and Policy ConsiderationsRegarding Hazardous Waste Exports, 11 HOUS. J. INT'L
L. 379 (1989); Cusack, supra note 9, at 393.
43. Strohm admits that "the overall scale of the international waste trade appears relatively minor
at this time" (Strohm, supra note 26, at 130). Yet she leaves the impression that the waste trade
to developing countries might have been-or even must have been-a problem in the past without
citing any empirical studies to support this conclusion. Hackett states that "the amount of
hazardous waste exported either globally or to developing countries is unknown," and then bases
his critique of the Basel Convention upon the anecdotal evidence that indicates "the existence of
at least some problems, and more importantly, the perception of such problems." Hackett,
therefore, suggests that the hazardous waste trade problem may be more "perceived" than real.
See Hackett, supra note 9, at 297.
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the "global dumping ground"' through fraud. But a number of "anecdotes"
is not the logical equivalent to "data". It could be that Greenpeace's anecdotes
are only exceptions to an otherwise unexciting rule: most waste traders
operate legally and openly. While theories of waste trade icebergs are logically
coherent and conceivably possible, these theories have not yet been
systematically tested through empirical observation. The fact is that no one
knows how big the illegal trade really is. Furthermore, as will be argued
below, the size of the illegal waste trade will remain unaffected by the new
waste export ban.
Taking a justifiably conservative, skeptical view of the best available
data on waste transfers to non-OECD countries, it becomes apparent that the
evidence is inconclusive: it is difficult to gauge the effectiveness of the Basel
Convention, with or without the new export ban.
THE NEW WASTE EXPORT BAN

The Parties to the Basel Convention unanimously decided to ban all
hazardous waste exports from OECD countries destined for disposal in nonOECD countries, effective immediately. They also decided to phase out all
hazardous waste exports to these countries for recycling and recovery by the
end of 1997. Although the decision was unanimous, there was bitter
dissension among the Parties during the negotiations. Days before the March
meeting, the governments of Britain, France, Germany, and the United States
signaled their refusal to go along with the ban.45 These countries were
reluctant to impose an export ban on waste materials that can be profitably
and safely recycled. Developing countries and environmental groups
interpreted opposition by rich countries, particularly the United States, as an
attempt to perpetuate illegal waste dumping in poorer, weaker countries.'
Greenpeace labeled these opponents "The Sinister Seven." 47 Australia, Japan,
and Canada
were the last hold-outs, but in the end, all agreed to the
4
decision. 1
44. CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING AND BILL MOYERS, GlobalDumping Ground: The
International Traffic in Hazardous Waste (1990), supra note 26.
45. Charles P. Wallace, Asia Tires of Being the Toxic Waste Dumping Groundfor Rest of World,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1994, at 16; Michael J. Satchell, Deadly Trade in Toxics, US NEWS & WORLD
REP., Mar. 7, 1994, at 64.
46. Basel Treaty PartnersAgree to Ban Waste Exports to Nations Outside OECD, supra note 2, at
297.
47. Greenpeace, Toxic Trade Update, supra note 19, at 12.
48. Basel Treaty, supra note 2, at 297.

BUFFALOJOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol 1

Upon superficial analysis, it appears that the industrialized opponents
voted to board the "ban wagon" once they were convinced of the wisdom of
this policy. A deeper analysis, however, leads one to conclude that negotiators
for the industrialized countries finally agreed to the ban because it does not
significantly alter the fundamental provisions of the Convention-it maintains

the status quo. 49 Because the ban was presented as a "Decision of the
Parties," it will not be incorporated into the text of the Convention itself.
Had the parties agreed to an amendment or protocol to the Convention, 0 the
ban would have the force of a formal prohibition. Instead, the ban is a
"decision," which is more like a non-binding resolution or pronouncement.
Though the decision is not strictly binding on present or future
Parties to the Convention, some Parties may wish to interpret it as such;
others may not. In any case, there is no requirement that Parties adopt the
language of the decision in their domestic legislation or instrument of
ratification. Advocates of the ban seem satisfied with the decision of the
Parties to the Convention, and some analysts have stressed that it has legal
effect.5 ' Practically speaking, however, the ban will neither affect the central
rights and responsibilities of the Convention, nor will it alter the way that
hazardous waste is currently traded.
The ban is not entirely irrelevant, however; it has important "moral"
implications. It reemphasizes the principal that it is wrong to dump on
countries who are unwilling and unable to manage it safely. Currently, those
countries which do not want to import hazardous waste are, by and large,
non-OECD countries. Thus, the ban reinforces the status quo. It advises
those responsible for waste generation that they should also be responsible for
waste disposal. It also reminds more affluent nations that they have an
obligation to ensure that their affluence does not come at the poor nations.
These moral injunctions aside, the ban will not have much of an effect on
where waste moves.
TIGHTENING THE BAN IS A BAD IDEA

Advocates of the waste export ban can be expected to seek more and
more stringent controls on waste exports. It is likely that some Parties to the
Convention, spurred on by environmental groups, will move to strengthen the

49. One observer believed that the United States gave up its opposition to the ban when it
perceived that it did not have the votes to quash the ban. See US Business Group Withdraws
Supportfor Basel Treaty After Ban on Waste Trade, 17 INT'L ENVrL. REP. (BNA) 463 (1994).
50. Article 17 of the Basel Convention supra note 1, outlines procedures for amending it.

51. Bill Lambrecht, supra note 17.
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ban, or to make it universal.
reasons.

This would be misguided for a number of

The Illegal Trade Will Be Unaffected
Broadening the definition of what constitutes "illegal" waste trade will
not make it any easier for the international community to monitor and
control illegal transboundary movements (whatever their magnitude).52 The
anecdotes that Greenpeace and others cite as evidence of large-scale movements
of hazardous waste to developing countries were already illegal under the
terms of the Basel Convention. Merely reemphasizing their illegality does not
make these movements more controllable. In fact, sometimes legalizing certain
kinds of commerce can make exchanges more susceptible to governmental
regulation.
Consider the case of illegal drugs in the United States. Thoughtful
analyses from both ends of the political spectrum have argued that the best
way to control the use of marijuana, cocaine, and heroin in the U.S. would be
to legalize them. 3 Despite their high moral tone, policies of "zero tolerance"
have not been at all effective in reducing the flow of illegal drugs into the
United States. Legalization might make the market for drugs more transparent
and, therefore, easier for the government to control. If all waste trade were
legal, there would be no guarantee, of course, that all environmentally
damaging waste trade would end (ust as with the drug trade, legalization
would not necessarily mean that drug use would decline). Nevertheless, a legal
market can be better regulated than an illegal one.
A waste export ban, even a tightened one, will have no effect on
waste transfers that are made under false pretenses. Commercial fraud can be
expected to exist as before, because this trade was already illegal under the
original terms of the Basel Convention. The Convention classified any
transboundary movement that occurs without prior notification and consent
of the importing country, or that occurs "with consent obtained by States
concerned through falsification, misrepresentation or fraud" as illegal.54 The
Basel Convention's system of controls to make waste trading more transparent
was intended to guard potential importers of waste against being billed of their
money. The case of tainted fertilizer in Bangladesh testifies to the fact that the
system is not foolproof, and that some illegal waste trade fraud may be

52. Barry James, Waste Racketeers Threaten to Soil Cleanup Trade, INT'L HERALD TRm., Mar. 25,
1994, at 6.
53. See, eg., Martin Richardson, Trade Policy and the Legalization of Drugs, S. ECON. J. 655-70
(1992); Lester Grinspoon, A Harmfulness Tax. Legalize and Tax Drugs,J. ST. GOV'T 46-49 (1990).
54. Article 9 of the Basel Convention, supra note 1.
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occurring. But the new waste export ban will make little difference in
eliminating current waste trade fraud.

Trade in Non-hazardous Waste Will Continue
The Basel Convention purports only to regulate the international
trade in hazardous waste. 5 It is important to keep in mind that not all
exported waste is hazardous, yet non-hazardous waste can still pose risks to
human health and the environment. 5 A recent proposal to export waste
from the United States to Suriname illustrates the problem. The government
of the Suriname reported to the government of the United States that it had
learned of two separate plans to import waste into the South American
country. 7 The government of Suriname did not want to import either the
municipal waste or sludge mentioned in the two proposals. The U.S.
government expressed its support of the Surinamese government position, but
replied that the U.S. government had no legal authority to restrict these waste

exports unless they were defined under U.S. law as hazardous.5" Since neither
the Basel Convention, nor U.S. law regards these materials as "hazardous," 9

55. The scope of the Convention is defined in Artide 1 supra note 1. The Convention does not
regulate trade in radioactive waste, though as Decision 11/8 of the Conference of the Parties supra
note 3, indicates, the Parties will continue to strengthen links with the International Atomic
Energy Administration's Code of Practice regarding the control international transboundary
movements of radioactive wastes.
56. The distinction between "hazardous" and "non-hazardous" is a fine one. For a discussion of
the complexity of defining hazardous waste, see Michael Dowling & Joanne IUnnerooth, The
Listing and Classifying of Hazardous Wastes in RISK MANAGEMENT AND HAZARDOUs WASTE:
IMPLEMENTATION AND THE DIALECTICS OF CREDIBIIrTY 115 (Brian Wynne, ed., 1987).
57. Hazardous Waste: Possible Basel Waste Export to Suriname Cannot Be Controlled by US
Government, 17 INT'L ENVTL REP. (BNA) 409 (May 4, 1994).
58. The U.S. government does have legal authority to control exports of hazardous waste. 42
U.S.C. S 3017 (1991). Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984 to the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act. These amendments necessitate that importing countries be
notified and give their consent before exports of hazardous waste will be allowed. The problem
with the Surinamese case is that the waste in question does not fit the Federal definition of
"hazardous waste," and therefore does not fall under this legislation. Furthermore, the Export
Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. § 2402(1)(B) (1977 and Supp. 1994) enables the President
.to restrict the export of goods and technology where necessary to further significantly the foreign
policy of the United States or to fulfill its declared international obligations."
59. Article 1 of the Basel Convention supra note 1, defines its scope to include specific categories
of waste, as well as wastes with specific characteristics. These categories and characteristics are
listed in Annexes I and III, respectively. Also note that the United States has perhaps the broadest
national definition of hazardous waste in the world. For a comparison of national definitions
among OECD countries, see InternationalPerspectives on Hazardous Waste Management, (William
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the Surinamese government could restrict their import under the Basel
Convention only if it declared the waste "hazardous" and refused to import it
under the prior informed consent rules of the Convention.' Otherwise, even
with the new ban, the transfer of waste to Suriname would be perfectly legal,
despite its possible negative environmental consequences. In the end, the
importing country is responsible for ensuring that its own environmental
standards are upheld: in short, only Suriname can protect Suriname.
Non-OECD Countries May Become Complacent
One of the arguments in favor of the ban on waste exports is that it
makes exporting countries responsible for whatever leaves their borders.61
Countries that have outlawed hazardous waste imports-103 in all 6-may
believe that the export ban now relieves them of their own responsibility to
ensure that no waste enters their borders. Yet, the illegal trade will continue
to cause problems-perhaps even greater ones than that of the legal trade.
Cases like the one in Bangladesh could become even more common if nonOECD countries now relax their efforts to keep out unwanted waste.
Moreover, by placing responsibility for waste trade problems on the
shoulders of OECD countries, some non-OECD countries may think it
unnecessary to develop their own waste control laws, or to worry about
creating effective environmental institutions. This thinking undermines the
Basel Convention because the Convention encourages governments to create
"focal points" and "competent authorities" responsible for hazardous waste
import policies.63 Some non-OECD countries may believe themselves rid of
the annoyance and expense of developing these mechanisms now that a waste
export ban has been imposed. Ironically, while it may have been intended as
an "additional protective measure" for developing countries, 6" a waste export
ban may actually retard the creation of environmental awareness and
responsibility among some non-OECD governments. Specifically, the ban

S. Forester & John H. Skinner, eds., 1987).

60. Article 6 of the Basel Convention, supra note 1.
61. Cathleen Fogel, Break the Toxic Waste Habit, CHRISIAN Sci. MoNrroR, August 2, 1993, at
19. (Fogel is political advisor for the Toxic Trade Campaign of Greenpeace International.)
62. According to Greenpeace, 103 countries have banned hazardous waste exports, or have voted
to ban them in international fora. Greenpeace, supra note 47, at 16.
63. Article 5 of the Convention, supra note 1, requires Parties to "designate or establish one or
more competent authorities and one focal point" to facilitate the flow of information and the prior
informed consent (PIC) procedures.
64. Telephone Interview with Pierre Portas, supra note 27.
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countries to improve their own hazardous
may hinder efforts of non-OECD
65
waste management systems.

Some Non-PartiesMay Now Refuse To Ratify the Convention
Some countries remain opposed to efforts to ban the waste trade 6 .
The U.S. and New Zealand are the only major industrialized countries not to
have ratified the Basel Convention. The U.S. had little bargaining leverage at
the March meeting because it was a non-Party. Although the U.S. finally
agreed to accept the waste export ban, U.S. government negotiators continued
to express their disagreement with the ban on exports for recycling."
In the past, the United States has repeatedly affirmed its support of
the Convention as well as its intention to ratify it. The Americans have been
slow to adopt enabling legislation, however, because there has been a great deal
of disagreement between the executive and legislative branches of the61
American government about what this legislation should resemble.
American businesses that would be most affected by the provisions of the
Basel Convention have supported it. 69

The United States Chamber of

Commerce, however, recently withdrew its support after the adoption of the
ban may
decision to ban waste exports from OECD countries.70 The new
71
further.
even
States
United
the
in
process
ratification
delay the
Legitimate Recycling Will Be Undermined
Environmental activists, among others, have been telling us for years
that recycling is good. Recycling slows the consumption of non-renewable
resources, decreases waste, and makes good economic sense. Even recovery
operations that specialize in handling hazardous waste are perceived as helpful,
even though they do not solve every problem associated with the hazardous

65. Hilz and Ehrenfeld, supra note 26 at 42.

66. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
67. Bill Lambrecht, supra note 17 (quoting Rage Pomerance, United States Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for the Environment).
68. See Sean D. Murphy, The Basel Convention on Hazardous Wastes, 35 ENVIRONMENT 42-44
(1993).
69. Industry, Administration Urge Senate to Ratify Convention on Waste Shipments, (BNA), Mar.
16, 1992, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, Int'l Env'tl Daily File.
70. U.S. Business Group Withdraws Supportfor Basel Treaty After Ban on Waste Trade, 15 INT'L
ENVTL. REP. (BNA) 463-64, June 1, 1994.
71. Bill Lambrecht, supra note 17.
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waste generation. No form of recycling is cost-free or risk-free.72 Yet, even
the most deleterious of waste materials, like lead-acid car batteries, can be
profitably and safely recycled.73 The new waste export ban, however, will
make it illegal to export waste to non-OECD countries for the purpose of
recycling at the end of 1996. The waste export ban may actually impede
global recycling efforts that are otherwise environmentally wise and
economically sensible.
One particular subcategory of waste trade fraud is what is known as
"sham recycling". This occurs when importers buy certain waste products,
like metal or electronic scrap, with the intention of recycling or reprocessing
this waste to extract usable materials for profit, but they discover that the
shipment they bought is useless, and then must be dumped domestically. 7
This sort of fraud is classified as illegal under the Basel Convention, and its
victims would be justified in requiring the exporting state to re-import the
bogus recyclables. 7s
"Sham recycling" is not the same thing, however, as legitimate
recycling activities that are done poorly, or that harm people or the
environment. Some governments permit waste imports for recycling or
recovery, but make little effort to ensure that these activities are carried out
safely.76 It is deplorable when people die in connection with poorly managed
recycling facilities abroad, as has occurred at a notoriously dangerous mercury
recovery facility in South Africa! 7 But two things must be kept in mind
about these facilities. First, the majority of materials being treated at these

72. For a general introduction to the pros and cons of recycling, see Bill Breen, Is Recycling
Succeeding?, 5 (3) GARBAGE 36-43 (1993).
73. Greenpeace Claims U.S. Auto Batteries Source of Worker Lead Poisoning Overseas, 17 INT'L
ENV'TL REP. (BNA) 283 (Mar. 23, 1994): "The Battery Council International, a Chicago-based
group that represents manufacturers and recyclers of lead-acid batteries, said in a March 10
statement that 96 percent of the battery lead available in the United States is recycled
domestically." Furthermore, lead recycling is not necessarily safe just because it takes place in an
OECD country; an American lead recycler has come under fire for not protecting its workers.
See Randy Lee Loftis and Craig Flournoy, Union Acuse Lead Recycler of Environmental Abuse,
DALLAS MORNING NEws, Feb. 18, 1994, at 28A.

74. GREENPEACE

INVENTORY, supra note

17, at 5-6.

75. Article 8 of the Basel Convention, supra note 1, outlines the duty to re-import illegal waste
exports.
76. Greenpeace Claims U.S. Auto Batteries Source of Worker Lead Poisoning Overseas, BNA, Mar.
11, 1994, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, Int'l Env'tl Daily File. See also, Lead Astray: The
PoisonousLead Battery Waste Trade (1994).
77. Michael J. Satchell, supra note 45, at 68.
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facilities are of domestic origin. Second, it is only the governments of these
countries which have the capability and the authority to protect the local
environment and human health. While one may argue that industrialized
countries should champion worker rights in developing countries,78 this issue
should not be confused with legitimate waste recycling.
Moreover, just because recycling or recovery operations are carried out
in a non-OECD country does not necessarily mean that the environment or
human health will be at risk. Greenpeace has condemned the government of
Singapore for permitting the importation of scrap aluminum (including
aluminum cans) and then "dumping" it.79 The Ministry of Environment
responded with the assertion that the aluminum processing facilities in
question were approved by the Ministry and met Singapore's environmental
standards.8 0 The Ministry has also argued that the waste export ban on
recyclables will hinder legitimate, cross-border recycling.81 Some non-OECD
countries are, in fact, able to ensure the safety of recycling and recovery
operations.
The new ban will permit a non-OECD country to import hazardous
waste for recycling after 1997, as long as its government informs the Secretariat
of the Basel Convention that it would allow imports from an OECD country,
and provided that the government specifies the categories and quantities of
hazardous waste permitted, the specific recycling or recovery process to be
used, and the final destination of the residues remaining at the end of the
recycling process.82 These requirements will encourage governments to
increase their oversight of domestic recycling operations. However, given that
some OECD countries do not carefully regulate these operations themselves,
one wonders whether these reporting requirements ought to be imposed on
all states, and whether they could have been instituted without a waste export
prohibition.

78. See Terry Collingsworth, J. William Goold, and Pharis J. Harvey, 7ime for A Global New
Deal, 73 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 8-13 (1994). For an opposing view, see Benn Steil, "Social Correctness"
Is the New Protectionism, ibid., 14-20.
79. Greenpeace, Toxic Trade Campaign, The Waste Invasion ofAsia: A Greenpeace Inventory 77
(1994).
80. Singapore Opposed to Illegal Waste Shipments: Ministry, Business Times (Singapore) Feb. 8,
1994, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, Bus. Times File.
81. Dominic Nathan, Ban on Waste Imports Wdl Hamper Recycling, THE STRAITS TIMES
(Singapore), Feb. 7, 1994, at 21.
82. Decision 11/12 of the Conference of the Parties of the Basel Convention, supra note 3, at
paragraph 3.
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Not All Non-OECD CountriesAre Alike
The example of Singapore highlights the fact that all non-OECD
countries were created equal. Within this group of 150-odd states, there are
enormous differences in their levels of economic development and their
governmental structures. In discussions of international environmental issues,
some have a tendency to divide the world into two competing groups (North
vs. South, developed vs. developing, OECD vs. non-OECD).83 While this
bifurcation is convenient; it ignores the essential differences among states on

both sides of the divide.
For example, Taiwan and Haiti are both non-OECD countries, but

their economic and political circumstances could not be more diametrically
opposed. Likewise, Turkey bears little resemblance politically or economically

to the United States, yet both are members of the OECD. Mexico, which has
been categorized as a country unable to prevent or safety manage hazardous
waste imports, 4 will soon become a member of the OECD.8"
Some have emphasized official corruption as an indicator of a

country's likelihood to import hazardous waste.86 Certainly corruption exists
in a number of non-OECD countries; yet both Japan and Italy have also been
plagued by recent corruption scandals.17 Spain has been cited by Greenpeace
as notoriously incapable of handling hazardous waste imports.88 Hong Kong,
on the other hand, has a brand new, government-regulated, state-of-the-art

83. See e-g., Gareth Porter and Janet Welsh Brown, Global Environmental Politics, chapter 4
(1991).
84. GREENPEACE INVENTORY, supra note 17, at 157-63.
85. OECD Official Says Mexican Membership Will Not Improve Environmental Regulations, 17
INT'L ENVIT REP. (BNA) 427 (May 18, 1994).
86. See Pratap Chatterjee, Environment: Bribes Help Sidestep Toxic Waste Ban, Say Activists, Inter
Press Service, Mar. 22, 1994 availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, Inter Press Service File.
87. On Japan, see Masumi Ishikawa, Why the LDPDebale? 36 JAPAN QUARTERLY 386-91 (1989)
and Takabatake Michitoshi, The Liberal-DemocraticParty in Crisis, 36 Japan Quarterly 244-51
(1989). On Italy, see Sarah Waters, Tangentopoli and the Emergence of a New Political Order in
Italy, 17 WEST EUROPEAN PoLrIcs 169-82 (1994).
88. Jim Puckett and Dolores Romano (Greenpeace International), The Great Cover-Up: The
TransportandDumping ofForeignHazardous Wastes in Almaden, Spain.- A GreenpeaceReport, Mar.
27, 1991 (available from Greenpeace International); Greenpeace International, Dumping ByAnother
Name The Recycling of Imported Hazardous Wastes in Bilbao, Spain by the ASER Company: A
Greenpeace Report, June 26, 1991 (available from Greenpeace International). See also Basque
Government Progressesin Efforts to Get German Firms to Clean Up Toxic Dump 17 INT'L ENV'TL
REP. (BNA) 276-77 (Mar. 23, 1994).
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hazardous waste treatment facility that is still operating below its capacity."
Based on these facts, it would be hard to argue that OECD members are
necessarily better able to handle waste imports than non-OECD members.
If, as advocates of the ban insist, it is morally reprehensible for OECD
countries to send their toxic filth to developing countries, regardless of the
circumstances, it would seem equally immoral for OECD countries to send
waste to each other. Likewise, it would seem immoral if one non-OECD
country wanted to export hazardous waste to another non-OECD country.
Such a situation is not far-fetched. Malaysia is building a chemical waste
treatment and disposal facility with the aid of a Danish firm9 The
government has contemplated the idea of permitting waste imports from
neighboring countries, which apparently have no immediate plans to build
such facilities of their own. The advantages of importing hazardous waste
would be two-fold: Malaysia would be able to operate its treatment facility at
a higher capacity, thus increasing return on its investment; and Malaysia's
neighbors would be able to dispose of their toxic waste much more safely than
they otherwise could. But because of strident opposition by environmental
groups, 91 the Malaysian government has abandoned any further discussion of
waste imports or regional cooperation on hazardous waste disposal.9
The Organization of African Unity (OAU) foresaw a day when
African countries might cooperate with each other to manage regional
hazardous waste disposal facilities. While banning all imports of hazardous
waste into Africa, the 1990 Bamako Convention would permit the

89. Kathy Griffin, $1B PlantFailsto Halt Toxic Dumping,SOUTH CHINA MORNINGPOST (Hong
Kong), Feb. 7, 1994, at 3.
90. Ab. Rahman Awang and Ibrahim Shafii, Country Report: Malaysia, at 34-37 in Proceedings
of the Regional Seminar on the Implementation of the Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste and Their Disposal, Apr. 11-13, 1994, Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia. (Seminar organized by the Centre for Environment, Technology and
Development, Malaysia [CETDEM], in collaboration with the Department of Environment,
Malaysia, and the UNEP Secretariat of the Basel Convention, Geneva.)
91. Consumers Association of Penang (Malaysia), Dangers of Toxic Waste Dumps, UTUsAN
KONSUMER, no. 291 (1992).
92. Interview with Dato Dr. Abu Bakar Jaafar, Director General of the Department of
Environment, Malaysia, at the Regional Seminar on the Implementation of the Basel Convention
(Apr. 11-13, 1994), Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia supra note 89. Although Malaysia backed the recent
waste export ban, its Environment Minister does not want all waste trade to be banned; rather,
"non-OECD countries should be allowed to export their toxic waste to OECD countries, since
they have the necessary facilities to treat and dispose of it", Base! Convention: Malaysia Backs
Export Ban, Greenwire, Mar. 10, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Greenwire File
(compiled from an article by Pan Hin Yue in the NEW STRArrS TIMES (Kuala Lumpur), Mar. 3,
1994).

1994]

BANNING WASTE EXPORTS

transboundary movement of hazardous waste among its members. 3 An
environmental group in the Philippines is spearheading a drive to adopt a
similar Convention within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN). 4 Ironically, a Bamako-type convention would legitimize the
Malaysian government's interest in importing toxic waste from its
neighbors."

EnvironmentalProtection,Not Politics,Should Guide Policy
Most environmental writers emphasize the primacy of the natural
world over the political. 6 Yet, with regard to the waste trade, questions of
environmental protection tend to become lost in arguments about:
membership in certain organizations, relative levels of economic development,
or the legitimacy of certain governments. Ironically, the origin of a particular
barrel full of waste has come to matter more to waste trade activists than how
it is managed.
Hazardous waste is nasty. But it is no more deleterious for having
crossed a political boundary. Unsafe disposal of hazardous waste is deplorable,
whether the waste in question originated from next door or across the world.
Hazardous waste ought to be treated and disposed of in ways-and in placesthat insure protection of human health and the environment. From an
environmental point of view, it does not matter whether the government in
power is rich or poor, democratic or totalitarian, honest or corrupt. What
matters is whether that political entity in question has the will and the ability
to protect the environment.
The measure of morality on this issue ought to be the degree to which
a state can protect the health and the environment of those people living
within its jurisdiction. If a government allows its people to be poisoned (by
local waste or foreign waste), then that government should be made
accountable. If a country is unable to protect the health and welfare of its

93. Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import Into Africa and the Control of Transboundary
Movement and Management ofHazardous Wastes Within Africa adopted in Bamako, Mali,Jan. 29,
1991 reprinted in 30... 773 (1991). (not yet in force). For analyses of the Convention, see C.
Russel H. Shearer, ComparativeAnalysis of the Basd and Bamako Conventions on HazardousWaste,
23 Env'tl L 107 (1993); and J. Wylie Donald, The Bamako Convention as a Solution to the Problem
of Hazardous Waste Exports to Less Developed Countries, 17 COLUM. J. ENvrL. L. 419 (1992).
94. Interview with Anita M. Celdran, Campaign Coordinator on Toxic Wastes, Green ForumPhilippines, April 12, 1994. Ms. Celdran was part of the Philippine delegation to the Second
Conference of the Parties.
95. Article 6 of the Bamako Convention, supra note 92, outlines procedures for prior informed
consent (PIC) for waste traded within Africa.
96. See, eg., Jeremy Rifkin, BiospherePolitics: A New Consciousnessfor a New Century (1991).

BUFFALO JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 1

citizens, then it should close down the offending disposal or recycling facilities,
or, better yet, make more concerted efforts to regulate the domestic waste
management industry. Such changes in policy are possible in non-OECD
countries, and are happening. In South Africa, for example, a notoriously
dirty mercury recovery facility, where two workers have died, has finally come
under heavy government scrutinyY In the past, waste trade activists have
repeatedly focused on the foreign origin of a small portion of the waste treated
at this plant," but even if none of the waste processed at this plant had come
from abroad, the facility still would have continued polluting the environment
and endangering public health by processing waste of domestic origin until the
South African government mustered the political will to do something about
it.
It might be more preferable to ban waste movements to states that
have inadequate disposal facilities.9
But even this concept is very
controversial because which entity should determine what is "adequate"?
Ideally, a global authority who would sit in judgment, declaring this facility
as "adequate" and the other as "inadequate", but, as yet, no such world
authority exists, on this issue or any other. Thus, the old, Wilsonian principle
of self-determinationo would seem to apply: each state, or each community
within a state, should be able to decide what is good for themselves.
Opponents of this view, however, argue that some states are not sophisticated

enough to make this decision for themselves.0 1 Which brings us to a further
criticism of waste export bans.
Rich Countries May Become the "EnvironmentalNannies" of the Poor
Perhaps the worst thing about a waste export ban is that it sets up the
OECD countries as "protectors" of developing countries. This has sweeping
implications because as "environmental nannies", rich countries will be able to
make decisions that will affect not only the environment, but the economies

97. Thor Chemicals Can No Longer Burn Mercury Waste, Department ofHealth Decides, 17 INT'L
ENV'TL. REP. (BNA), June 1, 1994 at 480.
98. GREENPEACE INVENTORY, supra note 17, at 27-41.
99. Both the United States and Canada have considered this option. See John H. Cushnan, Jr.,
supra note 36; and Environment Minister Says CanadaSupports System to Monitor Hazardous Waste
Exports, (BNA), Mar. 23, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Int'l Env't Daily File.
100. The "Fourteen Points" Address of the President of the United States Delivered at a Joint
Session of the Two Houses of Congress (Jan. 8, 1918), in The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, at 537,
Arthur S. Link, David W. Hirst, John E. Little, et al., eds., vol. 45 (1966).
101. Mitchell Zuckoff, A River of Waste from Rich Nations Flows to the Poor, BOSTON GLOBE,
July 12, 1994, at 1.
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of other countries. The OECD countries will be able to decide whether a
non-OECD country should or should not receive a certain kind of waste. If
a waste fits any of the descriptions of "hazardous" found in the Annexes to the
Basel Convention, or is defined as hazardous under the domestic law of the
exporting country, the exporting government could refuse to export that
waste-even if the non-OECD country indicated its consent to receive the
shipment. In effect, the rich country will be able to decide whether the poor
country is able to handle the waste effectively, resulting in a "new form of
paternalism".,l 2
Many developing countries have bitterly fought "environmental
imperialism" on the part of industrialized countries who seek to impose their
environmental standards upon them. Developing countries have sought to
assert their sovereignty over their own environmental resources as provided for
in the Stockholm Declaration of 1972.03 Malaysia's Prime Minister Datuk
Seri Mahathir Mohamad has been one of the most vocal critics of "imperial
pressures" on environmental issues. 1°4 Unfortunately, this contradiction
between sovereignty and international management of hazardous waste
disposal has not been seriously addressed in academia.05
The politically-correct thing to do would be to allow states to assert
their sovereignty and choose for themselves. Of course, this would permit
states to make bad decisions. Ultimately, however, the responsibility for
providing a clean, healthy environment rests with individual governments.
Rather than creating a system in which "nanny states" act as environmental
custodians for the rest of the world, it is more desirable to let all countries
decide for themselves how to manage their environment, including whether
or not to import hazardous waste. If they decide to refuse the waste imports,
the original terms of the Basel Convention protect their right to do so, and the

102. Christoph Hilz and John R. Ebrenfeld, supra note 26. Recently a noted Kenyan scholar has
argued that African countries, in particular, may need a new, benign form of colonialism in order
to develop economically and politically; Ali A. Mazrui, Decaying Parts of Africa Need Benign
Colonialization, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE Aug. 4, 1994, at 6.
103. United Nations, Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment
(Stockholm Declaration), UNDoc,A/CONF 48.14 and Corr.1 reprintedin 11... 1416 (1972), supra
note 1.
104. Michael Vatikiotis, Primingfor Rio: Malaysia Sets Tone for Earth Summit Agenda, FAR E.W.
EcoN. REV. May 14, 1992, at 22. See also Qfficials Blast Industrialized Nationsfor "Attempts" to
Link Trade Environment, 17 INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) 351 (Apr. 20, 1994).
105. Hilz and Ehrenfeld, supra note 26, at 55-56, recommended a "redefinition of sovereignty in
environmental protection issues," which would require states to relinquish their sovereign rights
to supranational authority. This may seem like an ideal solution, but it ignores political realities.
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Convention empowers them to force the exporting state to take back
unwanted, illegally imported waste.1
CONCLUSION
This article has criticized the recent decision by the Conference of the
Parties to the Basel Convention to ban the export of hazardous waste from
OECD countries to non-OECD countries. These criticisms have focused on
three areas. First, there is very little reliable information about the waste trade
that would enable an objective and systematic analysis of the effects of the
Basel Convention. The statistics are contradictory and unreliable, and
anecdotal reports do not amount to clear and convincing evidence. It is
unclear whether the Basel Convention was, or would have been, effective at
controlling transboundary movements of hazardous waste without imposing
an export ban on the industrialized nations.
Second, the ban itself may have little legal effect because it was
adopted as a non-binding "Decision of the Parties," rather than as an
amendment or protocol to the Convention. The unanimity among the Parties
was undermined by the fact that many still disagree with the export ban, but
went along with it when it was presented as a sort of resolution or declaration
of principle. In terms of its legal effect, the decision does not make much of
a difference. In practical effect, it will matter even less.
Third, the ban does not make much sense from an environmental
point of view. Advocates of the ban have portrayed OECD countries as
"sinister" criminals, and the non-OECD countries as the helpless victims of
"toxic terror." This view, while rhetorically attractive, oversimplifies the
many complex issues involved in the cooperative management of hazardous
waste. In the end, all the world's governments bear an equal responsibility to
ensure that all the world's environment is protected and human health is
safeguarded. While it is fine to "think globally" about hazardous waste
management, individual governments must "act locally" to manage whatever
hazardous waste, domestic or foreign, exists within their jurisdiction. All
states should have the right to choose for themselves how best to manage
hazardous waste, including whether or not to accept waste imports. Asserting
this right, however, does not diminish a state's responsibility for the health
and environmental welfare of its own citizens.
The Basel Convention is an important piece of international
environmental law, and there is much in it to be commended. The Parties
should also be encouraged to pursue many of the goals that they have laid out
for themselves at their first and second meetings. Specifically, more effort

106. Article 8 of the Basel Convention, supra note 1, obligates Parties to re-import waste that is
not exported in compliance with the provisions of the Basel Convention.
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needs to be spent on drawing up model national legislation for the regulation
of transboundary movement and management of hazardous waste; 07
establishing technical guidelines for the environmentally sound management
of hazardous waste," 8 preparing guidelines for the safe management of waste
destined for recovery facilities,'0 9 collecting and disseminating reliable
information regarding both the legal and illegal trade," 0 creating an
emergency fund to minimize damage from accidents,"' and encouraging
training and technology transfer so that all countries can safely manage their
own hazardous waste problems. 1 As with any international environmental
issue, there is more that can and should be done to resolve the many problems
associated with the international waste trade. However, to seek a universal
waste trade ban would be unnecessary and unwise.

107. Decision 11/5 of the Conference of the Parties, supra note 3.
108. Decision 11/13 of the Conference of the Parties, supra note 3.
109. Decision 11/15 of the Conference of the Parties, supra note 3. See also United Nations, U.N.
Doc. UNEP/CHW.2/12, Implementation of the Decision1/16 of the FirstMeeting of the Conference
of the Parties on TransboundaryMovements of Hazardous Wastes Destinedfor Recovery Operations

(Dec. 17, 1993).
110. Decisions 11/4, 11/18,11/22, and 11/26 of the Conference of the Parties address the collection
and dissemination of information, supra note 3.
111. Decision 11/2 of the Conference of the Parties, supra note 3.
112. Decisions 11/19 and 11/20 of the Conference of the Parties, supra note 3.

